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DELEGATION SUCCESS AND POLICY 
FAILURE: COLLECTIVE DELEGATION 
AND THE SEARCH FOR IRAQI WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
MICHAEL J. TIERNEY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In late 2002 and early 2003, the U.S. government was preparing for war and 
working desperately to convince the other members of the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council to authorize the use of force against Iraq. According to 
the U.S. government, Iraq had repeatedly failed to comply with multiple UN 
Security Council resolutions, especially its commitments to eliminate a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program that included biological, 
chemical, and nuclear weapons. In September 2002, President George W. Bush 
addressed the UN General Assembly and argued that U.S. patience was 
wearing thin and that the stakes for the institution were high. “The purposes of 
the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will 
be enforced. The just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will 
be unavoidable, and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its 
power.” Bush continued by asking, “Will the United Nations serve the purpose 
of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”1 Although Bush was clearly signaling 
his willingness to employ unilateral military force, he had both international 
and domestic political reasons to seek a UN mandate. Such a mandate would 
catalyze military and financial support from other governments for a U.S.-led 
military operation, and it would strengthen Bush’s domestic support among 
U.S. voters and members of Congress. 
Practically speaking, this meant that Bush needed a new UN Security 
Council resolution, explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq. To 
realize this goal, the United States would have to persuade the other four 
permanent members of the Security Council plus at least four of the ten 
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 1. John King & Suzanne Malveaux, Bush: U.S. Will Move on Iraq If U.N. Won’t, CNN, Sept. 13, 
2002, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.speech.un/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). 
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rotating members to vote for a resolution authorizing the use of force.2 In 
pursuit of this goal, the U.S. government tried repeatedly to shape the behavior 
and the language of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). The UN Security Council had previously granted these two 
international bodies authority to monitor Iraqi compliance with UN 
resolutions,3 to conduct inspections within Iraq, to report their findings back to 
the UN Security Council, and to provide opinions on whether or not Iraq 
continued to possess prohibited weapons.4 The U.S. government knew that in 
order to get reluctant members to vote in favor of the use of force, it would 
need UNMOVIC or the IAEA to report that Iraq was in material breach of 
previous resolutions and that Iraq’s WMD program posed a direct threat to 
international peace and security. Despite its great power (and its great efforts), 
the U.S. government could do very little to shape the inspectors’ behavior or 
the official reports of these international bodies. 
These facts led some analysts to conclude that UNMOVIC and the IAEA 
were “bad agents,” either because they were incompetent, biased against the 
United States, or corrupt.5 Consequently, the U.S. government paid significant 
“sovereignty costs” by delegating authority to agents that could not be 
controlled or directed ex post. Such conclusions stem from a misspecification of 
agency models or a misunderstanding of the source of the authority that was 
delegated to weapons inspectors. A clear elaboration of common agency 
 
 2. UN Charter art. 23, 27. The formal rules for passing resolutions at the UN Security Council 
specify that a resolution must receive at least nine of the fifteen votes and that none of the five 
permanent members votes against the resolution. 
 3. See Curtis Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6, fig. 1 (Winter 2008). This article explores a case of “international delegation” 
under the Bradley and Kelley typology, discussed as “collective redelegation,” using UNMOVIC as an 
example of an “other international body.” For a comparable illustration with proper nouns that 
correspond to the case of UN weapons inspectors, see Figure 2, infra Part IV. 
 4. S.C. Res. 1284, 4084, UN Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999). In terms of the Bradley and Kelley 
typology of delegation, the UN Security Council had delegated the authority to monitor, do research, 
and give advice. Whereas Bradley and Kelley suggest that “monitoring and enforcement” go together 
as one of the eight forms of delegation they identify, in this case the IAEA, UNMOVIC, and 
(previously) UNSCOM only had the authority to monitor. Enforcement of the disarmament resolution 
was left to the member states. 
 5. BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 240 (2d ed. 2004). On the view of the U.S. 
Administration in late 2002, Bob Woodward explains, “The intelligence indicated that Blix was not 
reporting everything and not doing all the things he maintained he was doing. Some of the Principals 
believed that Blix was a liar. In any case, it looked like the inspections effort was not sufficiently 
aggressive, would take months or longer and was likely doomed to fail.” For other exemplary criticisms 
suggesting UNMOVIC and the IAEA were unresponsive to U.S. demands, see David 
Albright, Persistent or Pushover: Views of Blix’s Record Vary, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at A01; 
Gregory Copley, Hans Blix and the Politics of Smug Myopia, DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
STRATEGIC POLICY, Mar. 2004, at 3 (“I will be blunt: Blix is a liar through distortion, omission and 
misrepresentation. He has shown his political colors, and they are anti-US.”); Helena Smith & Ewan 
MacAskill, As Arms Inspectors Arrive, Row Erupts over US Smears, GUARDIAN, Nov. 19, 2002, at 1; 
Steven R. Weisman, To White House, Inspector Is Now More a Dead End than a Guidepost, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at A13; Byron York, Blix-krieg, NATIONAL REVIEW, Oct. 1, 2002, at 31.  
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problems, and the principal–agent (P-A) models that are typically used to 
analyze such delegations of authority, help us to understand this case. 
Moreover, the framework developed below should help analysts avoid 
modeling errors in analogous cases in which groups of states pursue their 
interests through an international delegation of authority. 
This case suggests several lessons for scholars interested in analyzing the 
legal and political issues raised by international delegation. First, the legal 
mandates and the formal decision rules of international institutions are often 
efficacious, as they were in this case, and they have substantively important and 
predictable consequences for international outcomes. Although a single case 
study cannot prove that formal rules within all international organizations (IOs) 
are always efficacious, if they shape outcomes involving the great powers 
contemplating war, then it should not come as a surprise when they influence 
behavior and outcomes in trade policy, foreign aid, human rights, or other 
issues areas that are more highly institutionalized. Scholars should invest time 
studying IO decision rules and authoritative mandates issued by groups of 
member states to international bodies. Second, scholars should ensure that their 
theoretical models fit the empirical questions and political domains they seek to 
explain. Conceiving of international delegation as a grant of authority by a 
single state to some international body is often misleading, since most 
international delegation originates from group decisions within existing 
institutions.6 Third, as the Bradley–Kelley typology suggests, different states can 
pay very different sovereignty costs as a result of delegation to the same 
international body. Further, previous delegations can structure the political 
costs and benefits of subsequent decisions. Fourth, when new typologies and 
analytic categories meet actual cases, scholars can make initial judgments about 
the utility of the typology for organizing empirical analysis. In the case of UN 
weapons inspectors in Iraq, the Bradley–Kelley typology illuminates a variety of 
different outcomes, and raises additional questions that could be explored in 
this or in other cases. 
Perhaps more important than these four lessons for scholars, the case of UN 
weapons inspectors in Iraq suggests that delegation to international bodies can 
shape the political costs of foreign-policy choices by powerful states. If 
generalizable, this finding provides lessons for policymakers and citizens as 
well. Once authority has been delegated, even if the authority is limited to 
monitoring compliance and providing information, this prior decision can have 
profound effects on outcomes in international politics—such as the probability 
and the costs of war. Finally, both for domestic and international political 
reasons, there are good reasons to think that democratic states (even powerful 
 
 6. Mona Lyne et al., Who Delegates: Alternative Models of Principals in Development Aid, in 
DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 44 (Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); 
Darren Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-
Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Hawkins et 
al. eds., 2006). 
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ones) will be increasingly reluctant to use military force without the imprimatur 
of the UN Security Council. 
II 
STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH: PRIVILEGING FORMAL RULES IN IOS 
If we want to explain (or judge) the choices of states, the behavior of IOs, or 
the outcomes within and around international institutions, then a focus on the 
formal decision rules within IOs and official mandates issued by member states 
is an underappreciated research strategy. Such a strategy offers several 
advantages to scholars interested in questions of international delegation. First, 
it will help us to develop deductively sound and falsifiable hypotheses on the 
causes and consequences of international delegation. Since informal rules and 
norms are more difficult to identify ex ante, analysts will disagree on the 
substance of informal rules purportedly guiding behavior in any given case. 
Under these conditions, “testing” hypotheses can degenerate into spin control, 
cherry-picked cases, and literary criticism. When rules are clearly specified ex 
ante (in official documents, articles of agreements, and constitutions), analysts 
are constrained to focusing on their effects rather then debating, interpreting, or 
constructing their content to fit a particular legal theory or normative 
commitment. 
Second, a focus on formal rules enables legal scholars to make judgments—
both about the efficacy of international legal commitments and about the 
legality of specific acts undertaken by governments, IOs, and other 
international actors. A focus on formal rules does not imply that official policy 
directives, procedures, and formal measures of voting power within IOs can 
account for all the empirical patterns of interest. However, there are clear 
benefits to studying international delegation and formal institutions within a 
principal–agent framework, and there are some underappreciated costs when 
attempting to incorporate soft law, informal rules, and norms into social science 
explanations or into legal interpretations. Fortuitously, the number of formal 
international institutions is increasing, and the specificity and precision of 
regulative rules and policy mandates are also increasing.7 Of course, whether 
these formal rules are efficacious or epiphenomenal is an empirical question. 
Expanding beyond legal and formal rules, to incorporate social norms or 
nonauthoritative power relationships is incompatible with the meaning of 
delegation and, thus, the conceptual limits of P-A theory. International 
organizations (or other agents of national governments) may indeed behave in 
certain ways because they are responsive to global norms and they may also be 
responsive to third parties rather than (or in addition to) their principals, who 
have delegated authority to them. Hence, these other factors may be important 
 
 7. See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate? 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Winter 2008). See also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD 
POLITICS 1–8 (2001). 
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in explaining outcomes in international relations; but incorporating them within 
P-A models leads to flawed theory and concept-stretching. Worse, these 
amendments to P-A models will lead analysts to claim that their “P-A model” 
explains more than it really does. In order to specify the utility and limits of P-A 
models for understanding IO behavior and change, one must deduce specific, 
observable implications from P-A models and then test them empirically. A 
focus on legal and formal rules at each stage of any delegation chain will enable 
such efforts and will provide analysts with a baseline against which to assess 
various claims about the accountability of agents and the legality of particular 
actions. 
Of course, these claims raise the question: How should scholars study the 
influence of formal rules and decisionmaking procedures within IOs? One 
approach assumes that once states have agreed to pool their sovereignty within 
some international body,8 the formal rules governing collective decisions are 
actually efficacious.9 This idea is identical to the assumption that many scholars 
of American and comparative politics make when they study the behavior of 
legislators within committees or voters at the ballot box. The predictive 
accuracy of these institutional models will be shaped both by the validity of the 
models themselves (are they internally logical?) and by the efficacy of the 
 
 8. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 7. 
 9. See George Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News for Cooperation?, 50 
INT’L ORG. 379, 380–81 (1996). Although legal scholars have a long tradition of taking treaty language 
and rules seriously, such a practice is the exception among international relations (IR) scholars, to 
whom rules are either irrelevant, see John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 
19 INT’L SECURITY 7 (1994), or reflect underlying interests. The concept of “regime” was preferred to 
“organization” in part because the former approach could accommodate the informal rules and norms 
that seemed to account for much of the behavior that scholars observed but could not explain as a 
result of organizational voting power and formal decision rules. See generally KEITH MIDDLEMAS, 
ORCHESTRATING EUROPE: THE INFORMAL POLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 1973–1995 (1995) 
(arguing that a focus on codified treaties and formal rules within IOs actually obscures more than it 
reveals and “make[s] it difficult for these theories to offer accurate explanations”). The growth of 
formal IOs and the concomitant increase in the legalization of world politics provide incentives to 
revisit the impact of formal rules on international outcomes and state behavior. See John Pevehouse et 
al., International Governmental Organizations, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9–24 (Paul 
F. Diehl ed., 2005) (tracing growth of IOs); JUDITH L. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., LEGALIZATION AND 
WORLD POLITICS (2001) (considering legalization of world politics). Recent empirical work in this 
tradition suggests that formal rules may do a reasonable job accounting for patterns of outcomes in and 
around IOs. See, e.g., Mona Lyne et al., Who Delegates: Alternative Models of Principals in 
Development Aid, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 41–76 
(Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Daniel Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International 
Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003); 
Daniel Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank 
Environmental Reform Redux, 59 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 785 (2005); Mark Pollack, 
Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation, WEST 
EUROPEAN POLITICS, Jan. 2002, at 200; David P. Rapkin & Jonathan R. Strand, Reforming the IMF’s 
Weighted Voting System, 29 WORLD ECONOMY 305 (2006); Roger Congleton, Agency Problems and the 
Allocation of International Environmental Grants: The Return to Rio, 20 ECONOMIA DELLE SCELTE 
PUBBLICHE 125 (2003). 
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formal decision rules within the institutions under study. The first issue is 
addressed briefly in this article and at greater length elsewhere.10 
Of course, the most airtight theoretical deductions will be useless in 
explaining IO behavior, measuring sovereignty costs, or making legal judgments 
relevant to the real world if our assumptions about the efficacy of formal rules 
are overly optimistic. This approach presumes the efficacy of formal institutions 
and is thus identical to the problem faced by new-institutionalist scholars who 
study domestic politics. If stuffing the ballot box is a common occurrence, then 
the predictions of comparativists11 will suffer. If politicians listen to campaign 
donors or to narrow special interests and disregard the preferences of voters in 
their districts, then the predictions of Americanists12 will be inaccurate. 
Similarly, if the management and staff of an IO (or any other international 
agent) are primarily responsive to bribes, narrowly focused nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), or large commercial banks, then P-A models that 
assume formal rules of representation are effective at holding IOs accountable 
to legally authorized coalitions of member states will provide inaccurate 
predictions about IO behavior.13 
The institutionalist literature from the domestic realm has grown rapidly and 
has shaped scholars’ thinking about politics precisely because these P-A models 
have been able to account for a wide range of outcomes and behavior. As 
positive empirical findings pile up, scholars’ confidence in the utility of these 
models has grown. There has been no parallel effort involving large numbers of 
scholars over an extended period that applies P-A models to the study of 
international politics. Therefore, one strategy is to take formal rules more 
seriously than researchers have in the past, deduce observable implications 
from P-A models, and then test these implications empirically.14 
 
 10. See generally Nielson & Tierney, Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank 
Environmental Reform Redux, supra note 9; Mona Lyne & Michael J. Tierney, The Politics of Common 
Agency: Implications for Agent Control with Complex Principals (Aug. 28–31, 2003) (unpublished 
paper presented at Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n Meeting). 
 11. See generally GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE 
WORLD’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1997); AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: 
GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN 36 COUNTRIES (1999); MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART 
& JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL 
DYNAMICS (1992). 
 12. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN 
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 4–13 (1998). 
 13. A few positive results reveal little because of problems of observational equivalence, but if 
large numbers of studies are done within a given research tradition, then such accumulation of positive 
findings provides greater confidence in the utility of the approach. On accumulation of knowledge, see 
generally Gary KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH (1994). 
 14. This research strategy is distinct from the predominant approach to framing research in 
international relations, which has been to set up a “three-cornered fight” in which theory X and theory 
Y occupy two corners and the evidence occupies the third corner. The two theories make contested 
conjectures about the same evidence, which is used to choose between them. See Colin Elman & 
Miriam Elman, Lessons from Lakatos, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: 
APPRAISING THE FIELD 21–68 (Colin Elman & Miriam Elman eds., 2004) (describing such “three-
cornered fights”). This is not the strategy that institutionalists have pursued in American politics, 
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Analyzing the case of the Iraqi WMD inspection regime, this article focuses 
on the formal mandates found in UN Security Council resolutions that create 
new international bodies (United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and 
UNMOVIC)15 or identify existing international bodies (IAEA) as the agents of 
the UN Security Council. These agents were delegated authority to monitor 
implementation of various UN resolutions and agreements made between the 
UN Security Council and the Iraqi government. The original design of these 
delegation contracts and the selection of particular agents can be explained by 
the decision rules within the Security Council, the distribution of preferences, 
and the voting power of member states within the Security Council at time T1 
(during deliberations over whether to delegate). Efforts to direct the agent at 
time T2 (after authority has been delegated) can also be explained by the 
decision rules, the preferences of member governments, and the voting power 
of the various members that constitute this collective principal (UN Security 
Council) to which the agent (UNSCOM and UNMOVIC) is formally 
accountable. 
III 
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION AND PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY 
The key definitions offered in the introductory article by Bradley and Kelley 
are narrowly drawn and largely consistent with definitions used by a growing 
number of political scientists studying international delegation.16 Bradley and 
Kelley’s definition highlights formal delegations of authority from states to 
international bodies, from states to other states, from states to private actors, 
 
comparative politics, or economics. To paraphrase the editor of a prominent journal in advocating a 
normal scientific approach: 
 Stop worrying about the alternative theory so much. Its champions will claim that you have 
mis-characterized their model no matter how careful you are. Concentrate on making your 
own argument and then testing it. If lots of people do that for the next ten years, then we will 
have some sense about whether you are onto something.   
Confidential Editorial Comments, provided by a Prominent Social Science Journal Editor, via email 
exchange (May 2002). 
 15. UNSCOM is the United Nations Special Commission tasked by the Security Council to 
monitor Iraq’s compliance with various UN Security Council resolutions ending the 1990–1991 Gulf 
War. UNMOVIC is the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission 
established in 1999 to replace UNSCOM. For a clear description and history, see Sean D. Murphy, 
Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections, 96 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 956 (2002). 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) predated the conflict in Iraq, but due to its technical 
expertise, it was tasked by the Security Council in 1991 and again in 1999 to monitor Iraqi compliance 
in the area of nuclear programs. 
 16. See generally BARBARA KOREMENOS ET AL., THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2001); MARK POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2003); Nielson 
& Tierney, Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform Redux, supra 
note 9; Darren Hawkins et al., Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and 
Principal Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3–38 
(Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Alex Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic 
of Information Transmission, 60 INT’L ORG. 1 (2006); Michael Lipson, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: 
U.N. Arms Inspections and the Politics of Security Council Resolution 1441 (Sept. 3, 2006) 
(unpublished paper presented at APSA Conference). 
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and from international bodies to either states, private actors, or other 
international bodies. For these reasons, the Bradley–Kelley definition will 
enable research findings to accumulate and should also enhance communication 
between political scientists and legal scholars working on these issues. The 
Bradley and Kelley approach to international delegation differs conceptually 
from those adopted by the growing P-A literature in political science in only a 
few ways. Most of these are mainly rhetorical or reveal themselves only during 
model specification or empirical application. 
A. A Plea for Counter-Proliferation . . . of Conceptual Terms  
New ideas often require new language to describe them and to distinguish 
them from existing ones. However, renaming existing concepts that can 
accommodate new ideas actually inhibits the accumulation of knowledge and 
interdisciplinary research. Scholars of international delegation in economics, 
political science, and law are now becoming familiar with the language and 
concepts of P-A theory, so jettisoning the language without challenging the 
basic paradigm offers little payoff. Bradley and Kelley offer a very clear, and 
possibly the most comprehensive, discussion of the concept of international 
delegation currently in print. No other book or article provides as general a 
discussion of the numerous links in any real or hypothetical chain of delegation. 
With minor amendments, all of their discussion can be reframed in the language 
of P-A theory without losing any analytic rigor or reducing the number of 
research questions that emerge from their discussion. If this claim is true, then 
one should question the wisdom of inventing new words for old ideas. 
In addition to easing communication between different scholarly 
communities, clarifying concepts surrounding international delegation allows 
scholars to more accurately identify the empirical referents of “principal” and 
“agent” in the real world that researchers are studying.17 This point is illustrated 
by offering a general definition of delegation, discussing different types of 
delegation relationships, and distinguishing between single, collective, and 
multiple principals. These distinctions bear directly upon the subsequent 
analysis of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC behavior from 1991 to 2003 presented in 
Part IV of this paper. 
 
 17. In order to develop a general approach to international delegation, our definitions must be 
broader than “a grant of authority by a state to an international body . . . .” There are two reasons for 
this, and both are revealed in the cogent discussion by Bradley and Kelley. First, because of the 
possibility of redelegation, any given delegation contract may not involve a state, but rather come from 
some international body that is itself acting on the basis of delegated authority. Bradley & Kelley, supra 
note 3, at 5. Second, and more importantly, most delegations of authority to international bodies or 
even to other states do not arise from individual decisions by states, but through collective decisions by 
groups of states that are authorized to delegate, redelegate, or change an existing delegation contract. 
Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 6–9. In the case study that follows, no individual state had the 
authority to create UNSCOM, direct it, hire its personnel, or fire its leader. Of course, any discussion of 
principals and agents could be avoided even while still developing a general framework and using new 
terms such as “delegator,” “delegators,” “entity,” “delegatee,” or “trustee.” But, as argued below, any 
delegation of authority implies “principals” and “agents.” Hence, I use these conventional terms in this 
article. 
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B. Conceptual Distinctions and Behavioral Expectations 
Delegation occurs when an actor X (or actors XYZ) who is authorized to 
make a decision or take some action conditionally designates some other actor 
(or actors) to make that decision or take that action. Notice that this definition 
implies some preexisting set of laws or rules that establish property rights. 
Succinctly put, authority implies hierarchy.18 Typically, in the economics context 
these are rights of ownership.19 In the context of domestic politics, a 
constitutional rule or a statute authorizing specific actors to make particular 
types of decisions is typically the source of authority.20 For example, legislators 
are granted the authority to make laws, whereas courts are granted the 
authority to adjudicate disputes. In international politics and international law, 
the institution of sovereignty implies that states are the ultimate locus of 
decisionmaking authority, and hence the actors that can choose to delegate 
various types of authority internationally.21 
However, although such grants can vary in terms of the tasks a designated 
agent is authorized to perform and even how easy such delegations are to 
revoke, they must be revocable in principle. Grants of authority must be 
conditional, or else they are not a delegation of authority, but an abdication of 
authority.22 This is the central distinction that Coase and Williamson make when 
 
 18. For the clearest discussion in the international relations literature, see KENNETH WALTZ, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). But see the theoretical intuition, developed in OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975), 
and the formal proofs found in JEAN TIROLE & DREW FUDENBERG, PERFECT BAYESIAN AND 
SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA: A CLARIFYING NOTE (1988), or any modern textbook of micro- or new-
institutional economics. 
 19. You can delegate authority to a plumber to fix your pipes because you own the pipes and thus 
have the ultimate right to do with them as you please. A plumber who works on your pipes without 
your approval is called a Good Samaritan, or a vandal. A plumber who works on your pipes after you 
have authorized him to do so is called an agent. 
 20. In this view the U.S. Constitution is a delegation contract that identifies the ultimate principals, 
“We the people . . .” and their various agents—Congress, President, the courts, and other authoritative 
political bodies. 
 21. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that such authority can be, and often is, 
redelegated to other bodies, and that the ultimate source of authority stems from the sovereignty of 
states). In fact, the case study, infra Part IV, illustrates this point clearly: Through the UN Charter, 
member states of the UN first delegate authority to the Security Council to resolve issues of peace and 
security, and then the Security Council redelegates parts of that authority to UNSCOM, the IAEA, and 
UNMOVIC. 
 22. This paper does not suggest that abdications of authority (for example, the shift from the 
Articles of Confederation to the Constitution in 1789) are impossible empirically, or that one should 
not explain them; but abdication is qualitatively distinct from delegation and should not be confused 
with it, especially when such conflation can lead to flawed tests of resulting hypotheses. The distinction 
also has political weight since politicians and activists often make claims that IOs are increasingly 
“unaccountable.” See generally Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in 
World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005); Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a Democratic Deficit in 
World Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV’T AND OPPOSITION 336 (2004). Legal scholars 
should care about these definitional issues for similar reasons, as Sarooshi explains: “Failure to 
distinguish between different types of conferrals of powers confuses analysis of the differing legal 
consequences of these conferrals and obfuscates the domestic policy debates that surround their 
conferral.” DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF 
SOVEREIGN POWERS 1 (2005). 
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distinguishing between markets and firms in their seminal work on delegation.23 
A market exchange takes place between two vertically equivalent actors. 
Integration of production within firms to overcome market failure necessarily 
implies a hierarchy—and thus a delegation of authority from a principal (owner 
of property right) to an agent (employee). As soon as the owner forfeits all her 
property rights to an employee, there is no hierarchy, and one is no longer in 
Williamson’s world of delegation under hierarchy, but in Adam Smith’s world 
of free exchange in a market.24 As legal scholar Dan Sarooshi explains about the 
first link in any chain of international delegation, “The first definitional element 
of a delegation is that the State has the competence under the instrument of 
conferral to revoke the conferral of powers at its own discretion.”25 
When one actor delegates authority to another actor, the former is acting as 
a principal and the latter becomes her agent. More generally, principals are the 
actors within a hierarchical relationship in whom authority ultimately rests.26 
Agents are the actors who are hired (and potentially fired) by principals. 
Agents are conditionally designated to perform tasks in the principal’s name 
and have the requisite authority to do so. By definition then, principals and 
agents exist in a hierarchical relationship that is defined by a delegation 
contract. As Moe explains, “The logic of the principal-agent model, therefore, 
immediately leads us to the theoretical issues at the heart of the contractual 
paradigm: issues of hierarchical control in the context of information 
asymmetry and conflict of interest.”27 
 
 23. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 387, 387–89 (1937). 
 24. All the major works in political science that attempt to explain the causes or consequences of 
delegating authority employ a similar logic borrowed from Williamson, and they all use the well-
established terms of “principal” and “agent” to describe the strategic actors in a delegation 
relationship. As Hawkins et al. explain, principals and agents are constituted by the act of delegation. 
See DARREN HAWKINS ET AL., DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 7 
(2006). If you have delegation, then you have principals and agents by definition. See generally DAVID 
EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS 
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); JOHN HUBER & CHARLES 
SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY (2002); RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991); Terry Moe, The New 
Economics Organization, 28 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 739 (1984); Pollack, supra note 9 (suggesting scholars 
should be “learning from the Americanists, again”). The take-home message from Pollack is that 
scholars should not reinvent the wheel in studies of delegation within the context of the European 
Union. 
 25. SAROOSHI, supra note 22, at 55. See especially chapters 3–5, in which Sarooshi develops a 
typology of conferrals of sovereign power to IOs. Like Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, he includes the 
legal possibility of “full transfers” of sovereign authority, but he argues that these are distinct from 
“delegations” of authority, which are conditional by definition. See SAROOSHI, supra note 22, at 29–30 
(noting that, even in the case of “full transfers,” “in practice . . . it would seem that conferrals of powers 
are always revocable so long as the State has retained its independent legal personality and not merged 
its powers and personality into a larger political unit”). 
 26. This definition follows from Torbjorn Bergman et al., Introduction: Parliamentary Democracy 
and the Chain of Delegation, 37 EUR. J. OF POL. RES. 255, 257 (2000); Kiewiet & McCubbins, supra 
note 24, at 4–5. 
 27. Moe, supra note 24, at 757. 
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Scholars do not gain conceptual clarity or empirical leverage by calling 
agents “entities,” “bodies,” “trustees,” or any other broader or narrower term. 
If some other actor has conditionally granted these actors any authority, then 
they are agents by definition. If they do exactly what the principal wants them 
to do with their delegated authority, they are still agents. If they do nothing that 
the principal wants them to do with their delegated authority, they are still 
agents. Such variation in agent behavior should be explained rather than used 
as an opportunity to proliferate new names for existing concepts. 
Equally important, an agent can be an IO, an NGO, another state, a group 
of states, or any of the other things that the Bradley and Kelley typology 
suggests.28 That previous scholars have used P-A models to describe delegations 
of authority to IO secretariats,29 NGOs,30 international courts,31 subgroups of 
states,32 an individual state,33 emanations of existing IOs,34 and even individual 
bureaucrats,35 demonstrates that the P-A approach is not analytically limited to 
the lower, left-hand cell of Bradley and Kelley’s Table 1,36 but instead is flexible 
enough to handle all the types of international delegation described therein. 
Although individual research projects using P-A theory may focus on just one 
 
 28. Although this approach is consistent with Hawkins, supra note 16, at 11, Bradley and Kelley 
provide a much more comprehensive typology and discussion of the various forms of international 
delegation—and thus the range of actual strategies that are available to states. Bradley & Kelley, supra 
note 3, at 10–17. 
 29. E.g., Congleton, supra note 9; Helen Milner, Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic 
Principal-Agent Problems, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 107 
(Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Mark Copelovitch, Master or Servant: Agency Slack and the Politics of IMF 
Lending (Nov. 17–18, 2006) (unpublished paper presented at IPES Meeting). 
 30. See generally BERTIN MARTENS, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID (2002); 
Alexander Cooley & James Ron, The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Action, 27 INT’L SECURITY 5 (2002); Steve Radelet, A Primer on Foreign 
Aid (Center for Global Development Working Paper, No. 92, 2006). 
 31. See generally Darrel Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION AND 
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 199 (Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Geoffrey Garrett, The 
Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171 (1995); Geoffrey Garrett & 
George Tsebelis, Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices, and Decision Making in the European Union, 
16 INT’L REV. OF L. AND ECON. 345 (1996); Pollack, supra note 14, at 165. 
 32. See generally Alex Thompson, Screening Power: International Organizations as Informative 
Agents, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 229 (Hawkins et al. eds., 
2006); Alex Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information 
Transmission, 61 INT’L ORG. 1 (2006); Lyne et al., supra note 9. 
 33. See Lyne & Tierney, supra note 10, at 6 for the example of the Concert of Europe, in which a 
group of states (great powers in nineteenth-century Europe) collectively granted authority to one of 
their members (France) to put down a rebellion in Naples. Political scientists are not alone in 
recognizing that a single state can be construed as an agent of another state under international law. As 
former president of the IJC, Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, explains, “The 1923 Treaty between 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein . . . seemed to constitute a case of agency, in which one State entrusted 
another with the power to represent it not only for the purpose of concluding certain treaties, but also 
for the purpose of claiming rights under those treaties.” Sarooshi, supra note 22, at 33 (illustrating the 
point that “principal” and “agent” have a specific meaning in international law and that meaning is 
consistent with the conventional use of these terms in political science and economics). 
 34. See generally Lipson, supra note 16. 
 35. Leslie Johns, A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International 
Bureaucrats, 61 INT’L ORG. 245 (2007). 
 36. See, e.g., Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 9. 
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of these entities, there is no conceptual reason to associate P-A theory with the 
study of “third party” agents. After all, the seminal work on “internal 
delegation” is located squarely within the P-A tradition,37 and novel applications 
of internal delegation within the international relations literature also employ 
P-A logic and language.38 
Perhaps the perceived need to change the names of agents to something else 
stems from the fact that some applications of P-A theory are closely associated 
with empirical claims by these P-A proponents that principals tend to get what 
they want and agents either respond to principal instructions, or else they are 
fired. Hence, “agent” has become associated with “good agent that does 
bidding of principal,” even though nothing in the conceptual apparatus of P-A 
theory leads one to this conclusion. In fact, P-A theory offers plenty of reasons 
why analysts ought to observe significant variation in agent behavior resulting 
in varying levels of “sovereignty costs,” which is one dependent variable of 
interest to the contributors to this issue. P-A theory is an ideal framework to 
explain such variation. 
Bradley and Kelley are right to emphasize that there is no delegation if 
there is no “entity” to which authority has been granted. Bradley and Kelley 
also emphasize the under-studied legal and political dynamics of cases they call 
“collective redelegation”—when groups of states pool their sovereignty and 
subsequently empower their representatives (or a subgroup of state 
representatives) to delegate authority to some entity.39 This point may be 
especially important, since such delegations of authority may be the most 
common in international relations,40 and since they are almost certainly the most 
consequential. In fact, no individual state is typically a principal in its own right 
with authority to direct, hire, or fire any IO agent.41 Instead, states are typically 
members of a collective principal. 
C. Common Agency: Collective Principal or Multiple Principals 
A delegation relationship can have one or more principals, and a principal 
can be either an individual or a corporate entity containing more than one 
individual. Following Kiewiet and McCubbins, a single agent with more than 
one contract with organizationally distinct principals42 has a delegation 
 
 37. Kiewiet & McCubbins, supra note 24; KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATION (1991); Thomas Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Specialization Decisions Within a 
Committee, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 366 (1989). 
 38. Thompson, supra note 32, at 229. 
 39. Often this intermediary takes the form of an executive board that contains representatives 
from some or all of the member states. For a graphic illustration of such a delegation within the Asian 
Development Bank, see Lyne et al., supra note 9, at 45, Fig. 1. 
 40. See discussion infra Part IV for analysis of one example. For a broader discussion of the 
frequency of such delegation in international relations, see Koremenos, supra note 7. 
 41. Once a state is a member of a collective body, council, or board, it can certainly quit and thus 
remove itself from the membership of a collective principal, but it cannot act individually to fire or 
provide authoritative instructions (redelegation) to the ultimate agent. 
 42. See supra note 24. 
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relationship with multiple principals. The U.S. Congress and President are both 
the principals of any given agent within the U.S. bureaucracy. Yet, neither the 
U.S. Congress nor the President requires the consent of the other branch to 
monitor, reward, or sanction that agent.43 The European Commission is 
responsible to both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.44 
Hence, either of these principals can re-contract with the agent independent of 
the actions of the other principal. Whereas the Council certainly possesses tools 
of control that the Parliament does not, the recent use of parliamentary 
authority to censure and force the resignation of the commissioners en masse 
demonstrates that this formal authority has political effect within the context of 
the European Union. 
The agency literature has largely overlooked another type of complex 
principal in which an agent has a single contract with a principal, but the 
principal happens to be composed of more than one actor.45 Such actors can be 
designated a collective principal.46 The most familiar delegation relationships in 
politics and government involve a collective principal. Groups of voters 
delegate to politicians, legislators delegate to party leaders, and nation-states 
delegate to international organizations. In all these situations, a group of actors 
comes to a decision among themselves and then the group negotiates a contract 
with an agent. None of these situations permits any individual member of the 
collective principal to re-contract with the agent directly.47 If the group cannot 
come to a decision a priori, then they cannot change the status quo. This 
conclusion holds for initial hiring decisions, for proposals to renegotiate the 
agent’s employment contract, or for giving the agent novel authoritative 
instructions. In all these scenarios, there is a single contract between the agent 
and his collective principal. The single principal and both types of complex 
principals are depicted in Figure 1.48 
 
 43. See Randall Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. OF 
POL. SCI. 588 (1989); Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 24; Thomas Hammond & Jack Knott, Who 
Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and 
Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 
(1996). Although the control of bureaucratic agents may be enhanced by inter-branch cooperation, it is 
simply not the case that agent recontracting requires cooperation between the President and Congress. 
Both of these principals have their own contract with the bureaucratic agent, and both have the 
authority to alter that contract unilaterally. 
 44. Pollack, supra note 16, at 75–154. 
 45. See, e.g., Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing delegation to a “collective body or 
subgroup,” as illustrated in Fig. 1). 
 46. Kiewiet & McCubbins, supra note 24. 
 47. David Lake, Delegating Divisible Sovereignty: Some Conceptual Issues 7 (Mar. 3–4, 2006) 
(unpublished paper for Workshop on Delegating Sovereignty), offers a telling example when he 
explains, “As a liberal democrat in a heavily republican Congressional district, I am typically very 
unhappy with the way my representative votes on legislation, but it would be inappropriate to say that 
he is shirking his responsibility when he follows the wishes of the majority of my neighbors.” Similarly, 
and obviously, Lake cannot independently vote his representative out of office. Therefore, he is not a 
principal of his representative. 
 48. Note that most of the literature refers to the first type of principal as a “single principal.” To 
avoid confusion, this article uses the same terminology. However, a more accurate description would be 
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Ironically, although collective principals are much more common in politics, 
political scientists have focused greater attention on the question of multiple 
principals. In the field of American politics, there is a vigorous debate about the 
independent influence of Congress on bureaucratic behavior. This debate has 
spawned considerable general theoretical work on the problems of agent 
control that are faced by multiple principals.49 Despite this growing knowledge 
of the multiple-principal case, political scientists have often incorrectly 
characterized individual members of a collective principal as multiple principals 
in their own right,50 and, as suggested below, this modeling choice can lead to a 
variety of errors. 
Many scholars implicitly assume either a single or multiple principal (such 
that each state can unilaterally re-contract) in situations that require a collective 
decision. This inappropriate modeling choice leads to a confusing set of 
questions that are frequently posed by critics of P-A models. As Chong and 
Weller ask, “Is this IO, as an agent, accountable to one, two, or the majority of 
states or to those with the most political or economic power? Or is it supposed 
to be accountable to those most affected by its actions?”51 One clear answer to 
these questions is to identify principals and agents in terms of the actual legal 
authority that has been delegated. If scholars allow the formal rules that are 
written into delegation contracts to guide their operationalization of P-A 
models, then clear answers to these questions about accountability and the 
identity of the principal will be apparent. Once these conceptual questions have 
been clearly answered, then empirical questions can be addressed in a 
systematic fashion. Without such agreement on these basic theoretical and 
 
“single-unitary principal.” Strictly speaking a “collective principal” is a single principal composed of 
more than one individual—its corporate nature is the distinguishing feature. 
 49. This extensive literature is reviewed in Hammond & Knott, supra note 43. 
 50. Fearon and Lohman both characterize voters as multiple principals of elected officials. James 
D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus 
Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55–97 
(Adam Przeworksi et al. eds., 1999); Suzanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of 
Special Interests, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809 (1998). For a more recent example focusing on IOs, see the 
modeling assumptions in Johns, supra note 35, at 248–58. 
 51. See Xu-yi Chong & Patrick Weller, International Civil Servants: The Forgotten Power 6 (2004) 
(unpublished paper presented at the 2004 meeting of the SGIR’s Sixth Pan-European International 
Relations Conference); see also Grant & Keohane, supra note 22, at 29–30. 
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conceptual issues, accumulation of positive or negative findings will be 
impossible. 
For example, if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s executive body, 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has delegated some authority to a military 
commander in Kosovo, then it will require unanimity among the members of 
the NAC to re-contract; hence, that agent is formally accountable to the NAC 
as a whole and no individual state can alter the delegation contract 
unilaterally.52 If the World Bank Executive Board is doing the delegating, then 
it will require a majority of shares, which could mean as few as eight of the 181 
states represented on the Board. If one were analyzing the Legislative 
Assembly of the World Health Organization, one would properly identify any 
simple majority of member states based on the one-state, one-vote rule. The 
possibilities are numerous and varied; one should not despair, however, since 
the principle by which one answers the questions posed by Chong and Weller is 
crystal clear—it depends on the formal lines of authority within the delegation 
contract. Whether one can explain anything using this approach is an empirical 
question, but it will certainly allow scholars to deduce falsifiable hypotheses and 
to answer positive and normative questions about accountability at the 
international level. 
D. Differential Delegation 
Not all members of an international organization have delegated the same 
amount of authority to that organization. Bradley and Kelley offer the 
interesting example of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but such 
differential delegation is also present in IOs (unlike the ICJ) whose 
management and staff have real authority to spend the resources of member 
states. For example, changes to the articles of agreement or changes in 
membership of the institution require a supermajority of eighty-five percent of 
the voting shares on the boards of the IMF and World Bank executive boards.53 
As a result, the United States is the only member of the collective principal that 
can unilaterally veto an amendment to the basic rules or to the membership of 
those organizations (because it is the only member with more than fifteen 
percent of the voting shares). Every other member requires at least one other 
member government in a coalition to do so. Although the United States has 
delegated authority to the World Bank on the issue of aid allocation, it has not 
delegated authority to the Bank or even pooled its sovereignty on the issue of 
changing the fundamental rules governing the organization. 
 
 52. On the Consensus Rule in NATO, see generally Michael Leo, NATO Decision-Making: Au 
Revoir to the Consensus Rule?, 202 STRATEGIC FORUM 1 (2003). For complications in the context of 
the intervention in Kosovo, see generally David Auerswald et al., Double Hats, Triple the Trouble: 
Agency Problems in NATO Interventions (Sept. 2, 2006) (unpublished paper delivered at the 
American Political Science Association Conference). 
 53. Leo Van Houtven, Governance of the IMF: Decision Making, Institutional Oversight, 
Transparency, and Accountability, IMF PAMPHLET SERIES 53, Aug. 12, 2002, at 1, 73–74. 
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The second example of differential delegation offered by Bradley and 
Kelley is also illustrative. If a state maintains a veto over the authoritative 
decisions of a collective body of which it is a member, then that state has 
delegated less authority to the collective body than states that lack a veto.54 As 
Bradley and Kelley explain, such states are less likely to pay sovereignty costs 
associated with such delegations. The obvious example is the UN Security 
Council, in which the five permanent members can veto any resolution and 
prevent any (legal) change from the status quo on issues that come before it. 
Although this example makes any initial delegation of authority comparatively 
difficult, it also insulates agents that have previously been delegated authority 
by the Security Council, since any new instructions from the Council to its agent 
are subject to veto by any one of the five permanent members. Once authority 
has been granted to an agent of the Security Council, no individual member of 
the Security Council will be able to easily control that agent ex post.55 This effect 
of formal rules has substantial implications for outcomes in international 
relations that are illustrated in the next Part of this paper. 
IV 
DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO WEAPONS INSPECTORS IN IRAQ 
A. Creating and Hiring Agents: Formal Rules, Marching Orders, and IO 
Autonomy 
At the end of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States and Iraq 
faced a bargaining problem. Neither country wanted to continue fighting, but a 
temporary ceasefire threatened to collapse over the issue of Iraqi WMD. Iraq 
agreed in principle to eliminate its WMD capability in return for a cessation of 
hostilities and a commitment from coalition forces that they would not 
penetrate further into Iraqi territory. However, the United States insisted on 
verifying the destruction of all WMD in Iraq and on inspection of facilities used 
to create them. Iraq refused to permit U.S. troops on its soil, claiming that such 
inspections would violate its sovereignty and provide an opportunity for 
espionage. The United States would not agree to a permanent ceasefire without 
some assurance that Iraq had actually complied with its commitments. 
Ultimately, Iraq and the U.S. military commanders, who were negotiating 
terms, agreed that UN weapons inspectors would verify Iraqi compliance. The 
delegation of authority to an international body helped to prevent a resumption 
 
 54. Moravcsik, supra note 23, at 336 concurs and explains the concept clearly: “Sovereignty is 
delegated when supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without an 
intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto.” 
 55. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-Contracting 
Political Power, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312–38 
(Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Andrew Cortell & Susan Peterson, Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? 
Staffing, Voting Rules, and Slack in the WHO and WTO, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 255–80 (Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). Both make similar points about 
the political effects of international decision rules in other empirical contexts. 
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of hostilities that neither side wanted.56 This welfare-improving deal assumed, 
however, that there was an international body available to perform the specific 
tasks required—an assumption that was only partially justified. 
The core elements of the inspection regime were spelled out and codified in 
UN Security Council Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991.57 Acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter,58 the Security Council ordered Iraq to document and 
then eliminate its entire stockpile of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
and their associated production and research programs, as well as all missiles 
with a range of 150 kilometers or more. The UN Security Council tasked the 
IAEA to verify the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, and it 
created a new organization, UNSCOM, to conduct inspections and verify 
compliance with the other three elements of the WMD program.59 
Equally important, the UN Security Council granted the IAEA and 
UNSCOM the authority to determine “any additional locations” within Iraq 
that should be subject to onsite inspections.60 Hence, these IOs had the 
authority (and they used it) to identify sites in Iraq that were not named by the 
Iraqi government, by the Security Council, or by any member state of the 
Security Council. This meant that the inspectors were given substantial 
autonomy by their principal in terms of where to look and how to conduct 
inspections. Further, UNSCOM was given the authority to request intelligence 
information from member states, and since these resolutions were passed under 
Article VII, all UN member states were legally obligated to provide such 
assistance.61 
In order to utilize this intelligence information effectively, UNSCOM itself 
created an Information Assessment Unit, which was essentially an independent 
intelligence-analysis shop. This unit was created over the objections of the U.S. 
representative on the Security Council, but in the absence of support from other 
Council members, there was little the United States could do to stop it, for 
altering the delegation contract once it has been authorized required a new 
voting coalition within the collective principal that included all of the 
Permanent Five (P5) members. A few years later in 1995, UNSCOM 
 
 56. COLIN POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY 507–42 (1996); NORMAN SCHWARTZKOPF, IT 
DOESN’T TAKE A HERO 451–72 (1993). 
 57. S.C. Res. 687, UN Doc S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). Resolution 687 stated that “Iraq shall 
unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless” of all named categories of 
weapons and their related research and production facilities. The regime was modified in August 1991 
by Resolution 707, which gave inspectors the authority to fly unfettered throughout Iraqi airspace and 
required Iraq to provide assistance in this regard. 
 58. See UN Charter art. 42 (making the resolution binding on all UN member states and implying 
that military force could be used to enforce the resolution if Iraq did not comply). 
 59. Whereas the IAEA was a large standing organization with its own employees and budget, 
UNSCOM was created anew for the purpose of monitoring Iraqi compliance. The total number of staff 
working for UNSCOM at any given time ranged between 100 and 120. 
 60. Id. ¶ 8–10, 12–13. 
 61. Usually, this meant intelligence and analysis from the United States or the United Kingdom, 
but UNSCOM also asked for and received raw intelligence information other UN members, including 
France, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. 
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unilaterally interpreted its own mandate once again, this time in the face of 
opposition by Russia, to create a Concealment Unit designed to discover 
prohibited activities.62 Again, since the members of the collective principal could 
not come to an agreement about the desirability of this policy, they could not 
alter the decision of their agent. In sum, at the outset of the inspection regime, 
the Security Council was unified about what to do, and delegated substantial 
authority to its agents to monitor Iraqi compliance.63 As individual members or 
even larger subgroups diverged in their preferences, they were unable to 
redirect their agents, despite repeated efforts by individual governments.64 New 
orders required unanimity among the five permanent members; however, after 
1995, unanimity was in short supply. 
Of course, it was not UNSCOM’s collective principal that objected most 
strenuously to the manner and location of inspections in the early- to mid-1990s, 
but rather Iraq’s government, which was occasionally successful in persuading 
individual members of the UN Security Council to pressure inspectors into 
showing more deference to Iraqi sovereignty. For example, in 1998 both Russia 
and France questioned Richard Butler, UNSCOM’s Executive Chairman, and 
Scott Ritter, the head of UNSCOM’s Concealment Unit. Russia and France 
claimed that inspectors were being “overly-aggressive” in their tactics and 
unnecessarily trampling Iraqi sovereignty.65 But the complaints and demands of 
individual members of the Security Council were not authoritative instructions, 
and the UNSCOM inspectors found refuge in their mandate and in previous 
marching orders. They continued to follow the instructions of their principal—
previous winning coalitions within the Security Council.66 In every instance of 
Russian and French complaint, UNSCOM refused to moderate its behavior 
until it received an authoritative instruction from the Security Council as a 
whole.67 Such orders could come in the form of new resolutions or in the form of 
 
 62. See generally DAVID M. MALONE, THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE OVER IRAQ: POLITICS IN 
THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 1980–2005 (2006) (see especially chapter 6); SCOTT RITTER, ENDGAME: 
SOLVING THE IRAQ PROBLEM—ONCE AND FOR ALL (1999). 
 63. G.S. Pearson, THE UNSCOM SAGA: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NON-
PROLIFERATION 28–32 (1999); Alex Thompson, Principal Problems: The Rise and Fall of U.N. 
Weapons Inspections in Iraq (Mar. 22–25, 2006) (unpublished paper presented at the International 
Studies Association meeting). 
 64. In an excellent analysis of the Iraq inspections regime using a P-A framework and formal 
methods, Johns, supra note 35, at 269, adopts conventional concepts from a multiple principals model 
to analyze the case. She repeatedly refers to the members of the Security Council as if they were 
principals in their own right. For example, “Blix’s reports during this time period often induced intense 
conflict amongst his political principals.” As the collective-principal model suggests, as UN rules clearly 
state, and as the case study illustrates, Blix had only one principal—an authorized supermajority on the 
Security Council. This made changing the status quo very difficult, and it gave Blix and El Baradei 
great discretion. 
 65. Ritter, supra note 62, at 194; Thompson, supra note 63, at 8–18. 
 66. As always, a winning coalition on the UN Security Council requires a supermajority plus the 
acquiescence of all five of the permanent members. In order to redirect the inspectors, Russia and 
France would, at minimum, need to convince the U.S. and Britain to go along. 
 67. JEAN E. KRASNO & JAMES S. SUTTERLIN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND IRAQ: DEFANGING 
THE VIPER 41–77 (2003); Pearson, supra note 63, at 41; Ritter, supra note 62, at 194–95. 
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official statements from the Council. But these were few and far between, since 
the permanent members of the Security Council disagreed on the conjoined 
issues of whether the inspections regime should be softened and whether 
economic sanctions should be lifted. Deadlock on the Council allowed Richard 
Butler and Scott Ritter to appear defiant from the perspective of the French 
and Russian representatives on the Security Council. In fact, these agents were 
actively and effectively68 pursuing the mandate that they had been given back in 
1991. 
In 1991, the Security Council explicitly linked the suspension of sanctions to 
the formal certification that Iraq had fully complied with all the provisions of 
Resolution 687. The resolution explicitly identified UNSCOM and the IAEA as 
the agents that could certify Iraqi compliance, but the UN Security Council 
retained the right to lift or alter the sanctions regime that had been in place 
since September 1990. Therefore, individual members of the Security Council 
could still block any changes to the sanctions regime, but no individual member 
had the authority to certify Iraqi compliance after April 1991. 
B. Mapping Delegation Contracts and Their Consequences 
The formal delegation contracts in this regime were varied and complex.69 
The Security Council maintained direct control and oversight over UNSCOM 
during its eight-year existence.70 The Executive Chairman and the entire staff of 
UNSCOM were appointed directly by the Security Council and were not 
subject to the standard civil-service rules in place for most UN employees.71  
This exception meant that the staff did not have to reflect the geographic 
balance of the member states; its hires were not subject to ratification or 
oversight by the UN General Assembly, nor did the staff report to the UN 
Secretary-General. Moreover, the staff did not have to sign the standard UN 
personnel documents forbidding staff members from representing the interests 
 
 68. See generally Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 
Iraq’s WMD (2004) (unpublished report delivered to the CIA). Researchers now know that the 
inspection regime was extremely effective, since the U.S. military has subsequently occupied the entire 
country of Iraq and the Director of Central Intelligence tasked the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to conduct 
a detailed investigation into Iraqi WMD programs. The ISG spent more money in one year than 
UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and the IAEA had spent in twelve years combined; employed thousands of 
personnel compared to hundreds of IO inspectors; and enjoyed unfettered access to all sites within 
Iraq. Yet it found no evidence that Iraq had any WMD at the time of the U.S. invasion. Hence, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the UN weapons inspectors were highly effective at their job. Iraq had 
been completely disarmed of WMD by the spring of 2003 and probably much earlier. 
 69. See Fig. 2, infra Part IV.B. 
 70. See S.C. Res 715, UN Doc S/RES/715 (Oct. 11, 1991). These lines of authority were 
strengthened and clarified in Resolution 715 in October 1991 when UNSCOM was named as a 
“subsidiary organ of the Security Council.” 
 71. See Lipson, supra note 16, at 11. The original Executive Chairman of UNSCOM was Rolf 
Ekeus, a Swede who served from 1991 to 1996. Ekeus was followed by Richard Butler, an Australian 
diplomat who served from 1997 until UNSCOM ceased its operations in January 1999. 
10__TIERNEY.DOC 6/9/2008  8:07:24 AM 
302 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:283 
of their home countries, and UNSCOM was not subject to oversight by the 
Budget Committee of the General Assembly.72 
After years of Iraqi obstructions and significant success on the part of IO 
inspectors in verifying the destruction of declared weapon systems and even 
finding many hidden ones, the politics within the collective principal changed, 
and there was increasing pressure to relax the sanctions against Iraq. Three 
issues converged that would alter the inspections regime. First, France and 
China had strong commercial incentives to see the sanctions brought to a 
conclusion. Similarly, Russia knew that it could not collect on billions in 
sovereign debt that Iraq owed while the sanctions were in place. All three of 
these governments were increasingly interested in declaring the inspections 
regime a success and in ending the sanctions.73 Second, for eight years the Iraqis 
had been complaining that the U.S. government was using the UNSCOM 
inspections to conceal an espionage program against Iraq. In 1998 and 1999, 
credible evidence emerged that Iraq was correct and the United States had been 
sending intelligence officers to Iraq with UNSCOM inspectors, where they 
planted listening devices that transmitted information back to Langley, 
Virginia.74 Third, in the face of continued Iraqi noncooperation with inspectors 
on the ground, Butler issued a stinging report to the Security Council. The 
United States and United Kingdom pursued a new resolution sanctioning the 
use of force, but none of the other permanent members was inclined to approve 
it. On December 16, 1998, all UN inspectors left Iraq and shortly thereafter the 
United States and the United Kingdom launched operation Desert Fox, a 
bombing campaign that punished Iraq for noncompliance, but did little to 
damage Iraq’s purported WMD facilities. In the aftermath, Iraq refused to 
permit inspectors back into the country, and the Clinton Administration was 
nowhere near a decision to implement inspections by military force. 
 
 72. See Cortell & Peterson, supra note 55, at 255–80, for a discussion of how staffing rules within 
IOs affect the independence of different IO agents. As Krasno & Sutterlin, supra note 67, at 25, 
explain, “UNSCOM was structured in such a way as to preclude any possibility of General Assembly 
involvement, even in its financing.” This contract was designed to ensure that UNSCOM staff would be 
insulated from any demands other than those issued by an authorized supermajority coalition on the 
UN Security Council (all five permanent members plus at least four elected members). For a similar 
argument about how principals at time T1 design contracts to insulate their agents from political 
meddling by others at time T2, see David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency 
Design for Presidential Management in the United States, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 395–402 (2004); 
Nielson & Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations, supra note 9. 
 73. As one UN official explained in November 1998, “You can never have 100 percent proof of 
disarmament . . . so at some point technical exercise gives way to political judgment . . . . At some point 
it becomes impossible to prove the negative.” Barton Gellman, U.N. Team Downcast About Iraq 
Mission; Inspectors Note Eroded Authority, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1998, at A01. 
 74. See, e.g., Amin Saikal, Iraq, UNSCOM and the US: A UN Debacle?, 53 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 
283, 287 (1999); Ritter, supra note 62, at 143–44. See also an official rebuke in a letter from Kofi Anan 
to the President of the Security Council, S.C. Res 1172, UN Doc S/1998/1172 (Dec. 18, 1998). Ironically, 
this example of one member of the UN Security Council’s using clandestine means to infiltrate a UN 
body and perform intelligence operations not authorized by the UN Security Council reveals the limit 
of any approach that focuses exclusively on formal lines of authority. Of course, once this activity was 
revealed, the collective principal fired the agent and created an entirely new one (UNMOVIC) with 
checks and balances designed to prevent this type of agency slack. 
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By January 1999, the United States and the United Kingdom had no chance 
of getting either Iraqi cooperation under the old regime or cooperation from 
the other members of the Security Council to enforce prior resolutions.75 
UNSCOM was effectively dissolved in January 1999 when Butler announced 
that UNSCOM had flown its last aerial surveillance mission, and the following 
year saw the inspections regime drift with little new multilateral activity. In this 
context, the United States and the United Kingdom essentially agreed to trade 
a loosening of the sanctions regime in return for a renewed commitment by Iraq 
to allow weapons inspectors back in the country. This agreement produced UN 
Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999, which officially disbanded 
UNSCOM and created a new organizational emanation, the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).76 
However, Iraq insisted that any renewed cooperation would require 
protection of its sovereignty. These protections came in the form of staffing 
changes within the inspection agency. First, the delegation contract became 
more complex and included a role for the Secretary-General, General 
Assembly Oversight Committee, and the standard set of UN civil-service 
guidelines that ensure “neutrality.” Second, inspection teams were now 
required to have diplomats, in addition to technical specialists, as members of 
their teams. Third, UNMOVIC would be overseen by a College of 
Commissioners made up of twenty representatives of UN member states. These 
individuals would be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with 
the Security Council. Fourth, the post of “Deputy Executive Chairman,” which 
had always been filled by an American, was abolished. Fifth, UNMOVIC was 
now headed by an Executive Chairman who was nominated by the Secretary-
General of the UN and subsequently approved by the Security Council. 
Importantly, the new Chairman would report “through the Secretary-General, 
to the Council, following consultation with the Commissioners, every three 
months on the work of UNMOVIC.”77 The first Executive Chairman of 
UNMOVIC was the former Director of the IAEA, Hans Blix. Like his 
predecessors, Blix knew that his marching orders came from the Security 
Council rather than from any of its individual members, and in practice, he was 
even more conscious of this fact than his predecessors. David Malone concludes 
his assessment of Blix’s tenure thus: “In the crucible of fierce international 
pressure and media attention from November 2002 to March 2003 he proved 
committed to his mandate, independent in his views (over time infuriating 
several camps within the international community) . . . .”78 
 
 75. The U.S. government had now confirmed in official policy what Iraq had been claiming for 
years—that no amount of compliance would convince Washington to vote to lift the sanctions. In late 
1998, Secretary of State Madeline Albright suggested that sanctions might continue indefinitely. Later 
that year, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution calling for regime change in Iraq. Any incentive for 
cooperation from Saddam Hussein was then gone, and UNSCOM inspectors knew it. 
 76. S/RES/1284, supra note 4. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Malone, supra note 62, at 167. 
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Other Int’l Bodies 
The key differences (and similarities) between UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 
are illustrated in Figure 2. All the members of the UN (permanent, elected, and 
nonmembers of the Council) have individually delegated authority to the UN 
Security Council. Permanent members appear within the Council in italic font 
and rotating members in smaller fonts; nonmembers are not represented within 
the Council by a representative from their government. Since all members of 
the UN have equal representation in the General Assembly, all displayed 
members have identical solid lines. 
 



















The case of weapons inspections in Iraq focuses attention on the second link 
in the delegation chain—what Bradley and Kelley refer to as the “collective 
redelegation” stage.80 Note that in the case of UNSCOM, the Security Council is 
the sole principal of its agent. In the UNMOVIC era, the Security Council was 
also the most important principal, since that body had the authority to create 
the organization, eliminate it, approve leadership nominees, and issue 
authoritative instructions to the agent. However, in the case of UNMOVIC, the 
General Assembly delegates some authority through its agent (the Secretary-
 
 79. Figure 2 is very similar to Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 6, except that Figure 2 has proper 
nouns inserted in place of the general concepts represented by Bradley and Kelley. Lines with arrows 
represent delegations of authority. Consistent with Bradley and Kelley’s conceptions of international 
delegation at Stage 1, all individual states that have signed and ratified the UN Charter have conferred 
on the Security Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.” They 
also agree that in doing so, the UN Security Council “acts on their behalf.” See UN Charter art. 42, 
supra note 58. 
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General) and through its existing budgetary oversight mechanisms and 
previously passed personnel rules that apply to all UN employees, including 
those working within UNMOVIC. More importantly, the Secretary-General has 
some direct control over UNMOVIC through appointment rules, reporting 
procedures, and other rules that restrict UNMOVIC staff from reporting 
information to member states outside of authorized channels. Naturally, the 
Secretary-General is also responsible to the Security Council both through the 
specific resolution authorizing the Secretary-General’s role in UNMOVIC 
inspections, which could be rewritten assuming unanimity among the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, but also because the Secretary-
General is approved by the UN Security Council and can be reappointed only 
with a positive vote of the Council.81 Although the IAEA is not pictured here, 
its relationship to the UN and its member states looks more like UNMOVIC 
than UNSCOM.82 These changes to the formal rules defining the delegation 
contract between the new agent and its principals had substantial (and 
predictable) consequences for the behavior of that agent and the outcome that 
resulted—war. 
C. Type of Delegated Authority 
The actual authority delegated to UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and the IAEA 
was limited in scope to include monitoring and reporting on Iraqi compliance 
with Security Council resolutions. The organizations were granted the authority 
to determine and declare whether a state is in compliance,83 and this authority 
became very important politically in 2002 and 2003. However, none of the 
inspecting agents had the authority to “enforce” any resolutions. The Bradley 
and Kelley typology combines “monitoring and enforcement” into a single 
analytic category, and while these activities may go together in many cases, they 
do not seem to go together in this case.84 
The authority to enforce the resolutions was retained by member states. 
Some states, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, interpreted 
Resolution 687 as granting them authority to enforce the resolution if Iraq 
failed to comply. Other states, such as France and Russia, argued that 
enforcement authority was retained by the Security Council and required an 
additional resolution by that body to authorize any use of force in 2003. All of 
the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed that UNMOVIC 
and IAEA were the agents with the authority to determine and declare that 
 
 81. As always, nine of fifteen, with the caveat of unanimity among the P5. 
 82. For a detailed comparison and a compelling argument about the role of organizational culture 
within different IOs, see generally Lipson, supra note 16. 
 83. Robert L. Brown, Non-Proliferation Through Delegation, Ch. 7 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Univ. of Cal.–San Diego) (on file with author). 
 84. Bradley and Kelley have five ordinally ranked categories displayed along a single dimension, 
suggesting that some types of delegation are associated with higher sovereignty costs than others. Of 
the nine distinct types of delegation, the inspectors appear to have been granted two types: 
“monitoring” and “research and advice.” Supra note 3, at 21. 
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Iraq had fully complied with Resolution 687. Whereas both agents declared that 
substantial stockpiles of WMD had been destroyed and that they had not 
discovered additional banned weapons during their inspections in 2002 and 
2003, neither would assert any conclusions that Iraq had fully complied with 
Resolution 687 nor with subsequent resolutions.85 
Bradley and Kelley’s discussion of “agenda-setting” authority makes clear 
that none of the IO agents authorized by the Security Council were granted 
such authority. They certainly did have what Bradley and Kelley call “informal 
agenda-setting power,” since the information that they chose to report (and 
withhold) had a major influence on “the substantive agenda of an international 
body.” This influence was also clearly “the consequence of other forms of 
delegation.”86 The only reason the world waited with great anticipation and 
trepidation for the official reports of Blix and Mohamed El Baradei, the 
Director General of  International Atomic Energy Agency, stemmed from their 
having been granted authority to monitor and give advice to the UN Security 
Council. The substance of their claims shaped the voting behavior of states on 
the Security Council, and it shaped the willingness of other governments and 
individuals around the world to support or oppose the subsequent U.S.-led war 
against Iraq.87 
D. Costs of Delegation 
Bradley and Kelley suggest a number of interesting hypotheses on the 
varying level of costs paid by states that participate in any multilateral 
international delegation of authority. One of their central claims is that 
different states can pay different costs as the result of the same episode of 
international delegation. The case of weapons inspections in Iraq certainly 
illustrates this point. 
The most extreme costs associated with international delegations of 
authority imply interference with “domestic authority” structures, or situations 
in which international bodies interfere in “relations between the state and its 
citizens.”88 UNSCOM, the IAEA, and UNMOVIC did not interfere in the 
domestic authority structures of any members of the UN Security Council, but 
they repeatedly intervened in Iraq by traveling to sites within Iraq against the 
 
 85. HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 241–50 (2004). 
 86. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
 87. See William Horsley, Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War, BBC, Feb. 11, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008); Gallup Int’l, Iraq Poll 2003, 
http://www.gallup-international.com (follow “Survey Archive” hyperlink; then follow “Survey 
Overview” hyperlink; then follow Iraq Poll 2003 hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 3, 2008); TRIP survey data 
reported infra Part VI. For extensive results from the TRIP survey, see Maliniak et al., The View from 
the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada, 
Program on the Theory and Practice of International Relations (2007). For analysis of the earlier 
survey data, see Alex Thompson, Understanding IO Legitimation, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: BRIDGING THE RATIONALIST-CONSTRUCTIVIST DIVIDE (Tierney 
& Weaver eds., 2008). 
 88. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 3, at 30. 
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expressed wishes of the Iraqi government, by revealing information that the 
Iraqi government sought to keep secret, by interviewing Iraqi citizens inside 
Iraq against the explicit instructions of Iraqi authorities, and, in the case of 
UNSCOM, by acting outside its legal mandate by engaging in espionage against 
the state of Iraq. United States Vice President Richard Cheney was certainly 
correct to characterize this inspection regime as “the most intrusive system of 
arms control in history.”89 Although it is common to think of the inspections 
regime as a one-way street of externally imposed policies, Iraq actually 
“authorized” such behavior by ratifying the UN Charter (thus granting the UN 
Security Council the right to impose its will under specific circumstances) and 
by subsequently making a series of explicit agreements about inspections 
between 1991 and 2002 with the UN Security Council in an effort to avoid war, 
get economic sanctions lifted, or both. 
The permanent members of the UN Security Council also paid varying 
levels of costs as a result of delegating to weapons inspectors. Throughout the 
1990s, Russia and France were severely constrained by the presence of UN 
inspectors. Both governments sought a relaxation of economic sanctions so that 
they could export restricted products to Iraq, and both governments sought 
modifications to restrictions on energy-service contracts. Such changes to prior 
UN Security Council resolutions would require UNSCOM and IAEA 
inspectors to certify that Iraq was in compliance with relevant resolutions. That 
never happened, and both the Russian and French governments continued to 
pay asymmetrical economic costs relative to the United States, China, and 
Britain. From 2001 until March 2003, it was the United States that was 
constrained by prior delegations to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. In addition to 
influencing the timing of the invasion, the inspectors shaped the coalition 
politics on the Security Council in ways that infuriated the U.S. government and 
prevented it from getting a “final” resolution authorizing the use of military 
force. The failure to get a final resolution meant that the United States was 
primarily responsible for funding and fighting the war and was stuck with the 
job of postwar occupation and reconstruction. To quote Colin Powell’s version 
of the “Pottery Barn rule,” “You break it, you own it.”90 As of July 2007, Iraq 
seems to have been an exceedingly expensive piece of pottery. Although the 
delegation of authority to weapons inspectors did not cause the United States to 
go to war and pay all these costs, the inspectors’ independent behavior made it 
much more difficult for the United States to assemble the type of multilateral 
coalition that would share the costs of war as it had in 1990–1991.91 Hence, the 
case of UN-sanctioned weapons inspections in Iraq clearly illustrates Bradley 
 
 89. Richard Cheney, Vice President Honors Veterans of Korean War, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESS SECRETARY (Aug. 29, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020829-
5.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).  
 90. BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 125 (2004). 
 91. See generally ANDREW BENNET ET AL., FRIENDS IN NEED: BURDEN SHARING IN THE 
PERSIAN GULF WAR (1997). 
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and Kelley’s point about variation in the costs of delegation paid by different 
state parties to any delegation contract. 
V 
PUBLIC OPINION OF GOING IT ALONE: A SURVEY 
Although the Security Council’s refusal to authorize the use of military 
force in early 2003 had little apparent impact on the behavior of the U.S. 
government or on the opinions of U.S. citizens, the immediate and perhaps 
long-term implications of the inspection regime and the failure to get a UN 
mandate are in dispute. Some politicians and analysts conclude that the Iraq 
case has led to a fundamental shift in the U.S. approach to the use of force—a 
shift in a unilateral direction. For example, a postwar assessment of the 
inspections regime by British columnist James Bone argues: 
Dr. Blix’s recent performance has not only discredited himself but has betrayed the 
trust of all those many millions around the world who put their faith in the United 
Nations. Worse, his disingenuousness has guaranteed that the world’s sole remaining 
superpower will never put its security in the hands of a multilateral inspection agency 
because he has proved it is unreliable.92 
However, there is growing evidence that the opposite is true—not only is 
the U.S. government currently contemplating the expanded use of the IAEA 
and other UN inspectors in separate nonproliferation deals with Iran and North 
Korea,93 but new survey evidence suggests the U.S. public is now less inclined to 
support analogous military interventions if the U.S. government lacks UN 
authorization. 
In October of 2006, researchers at William and Mary designed a survey 
which was carried out by a polling company (Polimetrix).94 The survey asked 
U.S. registered voters to answer twenty-one questions about contemporary 
foreign-policy issues. Four of the questions were designed to test hypotheses 
about the domestic political relevance of delegation to the UN Security Council 
to approve or disapprove the use of military force to inhibit WMD 
proliferation. These questions were asked for two reasons. First, a number of 
political scientists have recently theorized about the “legitimation effect” of UN 
approval for a particular use of military force.95 Second, in the run-up to the 
 
 92. James Bone, Blix Should Turn the ‘Smoking Gun’ On His Own Head, LONDON TIMES, Mar. 
12, 2003, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article1118964.ece (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2008). 
 93. Rebecca Johnson, Looking Towards 2010: What Does the Nonproliferation Regime Need?, 84 
DISARMAMENT & DIPL. (2007), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd84/84npt.htm (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2008). 
 94. For more on the survey and the broader project, see Daniel Maliniak et al., Inside the Ivory 
Tower, FOR. POL’Y 62 (Mar./Apr. 2007); Maliniak et al., The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey 
of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada, Program on the Theory and Practice 
of International Relations (2007). 
 95. See generally Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379 
(1999); Thompson, supra note 32; Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s 
Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527 (2005). 
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2003 war in Iraq, a number of surveys asked respondents in different countries 
whether they would support a war against Iraq with and without a UN Security 
Council resolution. Canadian and Western European respondents were much 
more likely to support the use of force if the Security Council approved such 
action. For example, in Canada support jumped from ten percent to fifty-six 
percent, in France from seven percent to thirty-four percent, and in Germany 
from nine percent to forty-eight percent. So, on average, support for war 
jumped four-fold with a UN resolution, and very few people were willing to 
support a war without a UN resolution. For U.S. respondents, the level of 
support was much higher for unilateral military action; it did not increase as 
much proportionally with a UN resolution, but there was still a substantial gap.96 
One might speculate that since the Iraq War has been more costly than 
expected, and since no WMD were discovered in Iraq ex post, Americans might 
be more affected by a UN resolution now than they were in 2003. Therefore, 
the TRIP/Polimetrix survey from 2006 asked each U.S. respondent to answer a 
pair of questions about North Korea and a pair about Iran. The survey provided 
no information to the respondents other than the questions. In each pair of 
questions, the survey asked whether the respondent would support military 
action by the United States and whether she would support military action by 
the international community after a UN Security Council resolution. 
The survey results revealed large gaps between support for unilateral 
military action and military action approved by the UN Security Council. In 
brief, support for military force jumped twenty-nine percent for an attack on 
Iran and thirty-two percent for an attack on North Korea after a UN Security 
Council resolution. Although the questions are not identical, the gaps are 
similar in magnitude to the gaps found in Canada and Western Europe in the 
2003 Gallup survey prior to the Iraq War. The effect on opposition to the use of 
force is even more remarkable, especially considering that the United States is 
currently involved in a very unpopular and costly war. If the UN Security 
Council were to approve the use of force against Iran, only sixteen percent of 
Americans said they would oppose it. Only thirteen percent reported that they 
would oppose the use of such force against North Korea. The results of the 
survey are displayed in Figures 3 and 4 below.97 
 
 96. Gallup Int’l Iraq Poll 2003, http://www.gallup-international.com/download/GIA%20press%20 
release%20Iraq%20Survey%202003.pdf; Thompson, infra note 101. 
 97. The first question was, “If Iran continues to produce material that can be used to develop 
nuclear weapons, would you support or oppose the U.S. taking military action against Iran?” Answer 
options were “Support, Oppose, and Unsure.” The second question was, “If Iran continues to produce 
material that can be used to develop nuclear weapons and the U.N. Security Council votes to use 
military force against Iran, would you support or oppose the international community taking military 
action against Iran?” Again, answer options included “Support, Oppose, and Unsure.” The survey 
included a similar pair of questions about North Korea. Maliniak et al., supra note 93, at 44. 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
Alex Thompson sums up the relationship between weapons inspectors and 
their principals in this way: “In these difficult circumstances, UNSCOM sought 
the truth about Iraq’s weapons even more diligently than could have been 
hoped for; it was a faithful agent.”98 Thompson’s conclusions about UNSCOM 
are accurate and can be generalized to the other inspection agencies that 
worked for the Security Council in Iraq. Whereas individual member 
governments of the UN Security Council can now identify behavior on the part 
of the inspectors that ran counter to their interests, with few exceptions these 
IO agents pursued their mandates and implemented official marching orders 
with exceptional energy and competence. 
The case of the Iraqi WMD inspections regime demonstrates the 
importance of distinguishing between agency models. Scholars that incorrectly 
labeled the delegation to UNSCOM and UNMOVIC as one from multiple 
principals determined that the inspections regime largely “failed.” The 
inspectors were “bad agents” and the United States, France, and Russia paid 
significant sovereignty costs by delegating to an agent whom they were unable 
to control ex post. Efforts by France and Russia to limit discretion of UNSCOM 
by restricting its ability to inspect undeclared sites failed, allowing inspectors to 
substantively monitor Iraqi disarmament. Moreover, the United States was 
unable to bully UNMOVIC to declare Iraq in material breach of Council 
resolutions in order to justify a war that the international community largely 
saw as unnecessary. The agents did not have to respond to attempts by 
individual states to renegotiate the terms of the delegation contract. 
Characterizing the source of authority for the inspections regime as a collective 
principal provides the explanation for this lack of responsiveness. From this 
perspective, inspectors fulfilled their mandates successfully, and the United 
States and the rest of the P5 benefited from the autonomy and discretion 
delegated to UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. Inspectors were not influenced by 
individual states or coerced to pursue objectives that the Security Council did 
not approve, but rather implemented orders from the Council with competence. 
The case also demonstrates the importance of reviewing legal mandates and 
formal delegation contracts. Scholars who inaccurately described the inspection 
regime as failing because it did not represent the interests of its principals failed 
to examine the formal relationship between principal and agent. The case of the 
inspections regime confirms that analyzing these documents is an important 
task of researchers studying delegation and P-A relationships. The legal 
mandates and delegation contracts that establish a P-A relationship matter and 
shape the behavior of both principals and agents. In fact, UNSCOM, 
UNMOVIC, and IAEA inspectors did represent the interests of their principal, 
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but scholars incorrectly asserted that individual states were the principals, 
rather than the collective institution (UN Security Council) that held formal 
authority over the inspections regime. 
Bradley and Kelley argue that delegation can be quite powerful when the 
actions of these bodies “circumscribe policy autonomy by creating international 
or domestic pressures on governments.”99 Delegation to UNSCOM and 
UNMOVIC certainly demonstrates how such IOs can result in “international or 
domestic pressure on . . . governments.”100 As the previous case study 
demonstrates, this statement captures much of the story behind the collapse of 
the Iraq inspections regime. Further, such substantial evidence as the William 
and Mary survey reveals that the UN Security Council is increasingly perceived 
as a stamp of approval for military action (or disapproval in the absence of a 
resolution supporting a coercing state),101 and may be increasingly important to 
citizens in democratic societies. Hence, the decisions of the UN Security 
Council may increasingly shape the behavior of political leaders who want to 
maintain the political support of their people within democratic polities, 
including the United States. 
Hence, this case presents a clear example of delegation success and policy 
failure. All the major goals established by the Security Council in 1991 that 
were designed to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to disarm Iraq had 
been achieved by 2002. Despite this fact, the outcome was an interstate war in 
Iraq that produced thousands of deaths, racked up billions in debt, produced an 
ongoing civil war in Iraq, and led to growing doubts about the efficacy of 
multilateral solutions in international security affairs. This outcome contradicts 
an implicit assumption of much principal–agent work: that when delegation 
“succeeds” and the agent accomplishes the assigned task at a cost lower than 
the principal would pay through direct implementation, policy outcomes will 
improve and cooperation will be sustained.102 The case of weapons inspections in 
Iraq appears to be a case of delegation success and policy failure. The agents 
did their jobs effectively and efficiently, but cooperation broke down, and 
war—policy failure—was the result. The costs of that war, fought without the 
mandate of a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force, have helped to 
shape the perception of U.S. voters regarding the utility of unilateral versus 
multilateral military intervention to prevent WMD proliferation and will likely 
shape the behavior of U.S. foreign policy in the future. 
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